DIVA: Exploiting Cross-Step Conditional Propagation for Visual Jailbreaks in Discrete Diffusion Vision-Language Models

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Project page | *Code*

Abstract

Large vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical settings, yet existing visual jailbreak research has focused almost exclusively on autoregressive architectures, leaving an important emerging family unstudied: multimodal discrete diffusion vision-language models (dVLMs). We identify a vulnerability that is specific to the diffusion generation process: because the visual embedding conditions every reverse denoising step rather than acting as a one-time prefix, adversarial visual semantics are not injected once but repeatedly propagated and amplified across the generation trajectory, a phenomenon we term cross-step conditional propagation. We provide empirical evidence that this mechanism is absent in autoregressive VLMs through stage-sensitivity analysis, prompt-level switch rates, and pairwise denoising-bin disagreement metrics, all confirmed statistically by bootstrap resampling. Motivated by this finding, we propose DIVA (**Di**screte-diffusion **V**ision-language model **A**ttack), a white-box visual jailbreak framework that exploits dVLM-specific vulnerabilities via cross-modal intent obfuscation and diffusion-aware multi-timestep adversarial optimization. Across three dVLMs (LLaDA-V, MMaDA, and LLaDA2.0-Uni), DIVA reaches 58.8%, 67.7%, and 69.1% HADES ASR under the Beaver reward-model metric, substantially outperforming visual jailbreak baselines designed for autoregressive models. Our code are available at https://github.com/loststars2002/DIVA.

1 Introduction

Large vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable capability across a wide range of multimodal tasks, yet their safety under adversarial conditions remains an active area of concern (Liu et al., 2023, 2024b; Bai et al., 2025). A growing body of work has demonstrated that autoregressive VLMs (ARMs) are susceptible to *visual jailbreaks* that embed harmful semantics into the image channel to bypass text-side safety filters (Zhang et al., 2025a; Xue et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024a; Chen et al., 2025b). However, these studies have focused almost exclusively on autoregressive architectures, leaving an important model family largely unexamined: **multimodal discrete diffusion vision-language models** (dVLMs).

Recent dVLMs such as LLaDA-V (You et al., 2025) and MMaDA (Yang et al., 2025) generate responses through iterative masked-token denoising rather than left-to-right prediction. This architectural shift fundamentally changes how the visual input interacts with the generation process. In ARMs, the image is encoded once into a fixed visual prefix, after which generation proceeds independently of the visual representation (Gou et al., 2024; Ghosal et al., 2025; Noheria and Yao, 2026). In dVLMs, by contrast, the visual embedding conditions *every* reverse denoising step. This property, as we will show, exposes a qualitatively different and more persistent vulnerability surface (Yamabe and Sakuma, 2026; Xie et al., 2025).

In this paper, we ask: *are dVLMs susceptible to visual jailbreaks, and if so, through what mechanism?* We answer affirmatively and identify a vulnerability that is specific to the diffusion generation process: harmful visual semantics are not injected once but are **repeatedly propagated and amplified** across multiple denoising steps. We call this phenomenon *cross-step conditional propagation* and show empirically that it produces attack dynamics with no counterpart in autoregressive models, dVLMs exhibit significantly higher stage sensitivity, larger prompt-level switch rates across denoising windows, and more persistent attack effects under partial-step interventions, compared to ARMs evaluated under the same conditions.

Motivated by this finding, we propose **DIVA**

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

Figure 1: The target dVLM correctly rejects harmful text-only and harmful image-only inputs. Yet, after adding a small **DIVA** perturbation δ to the image and rewriting the query into a benign-looking form, the same model produces a harmful response, exposing a critical weakness in multimodal safety alignment.

(**Di**screte-diffusion **V**ision-language model **A**ttack), a white-box visual jailbreak framework designed to exploit dVLM-specific vulnerabilities. DIVA operates through two coupled stages. First, *cross-modal intent obfuscation* rewrites the explicit harmful text query into a visually grounded prompt and transfers the removed unsafe semantics into a composite image, simultaneously reducing text-side detectability and concentrating adversarial evidence in the visual channel. Second, *diffusion-aware adversarial optimization* learns a bounded pixel-space perturbation by backpropagating through the bidirectional masked denoising process across multiple sampled timesteps, directly targeting the multi-step propagation pathway that distinguishes dVLMs from autoregressive alternatives.

We evaluate DIVA on three dVLMs (LLaDA-V, MMaDA, and LLaDA2.0-Uni) across HADES (Li et al., 2025b) and VLSBench (Hu et al., 2025). DIVA reaches **58.8%**, **67.7%**, and **69.1%** HADES ASR on these three targets under the Beaver reward-model metric. The aggregate gain is category-specific on LLaDA-V, while the larger gains on MMaDA and LLaDA2.0-Uni are statistically robust under the matched comparisons.

Our contributions are as follows:

- **Visual Jailbreak Framework for dVLMs.** We present DIVA, a novel attack framework specifically designed for multimodal discrete diffusion vision-language models. This work systematically investigates the safety vulnerabilities of this model family, a deployment area that has been largely overlooked in prior literature.
- **Identification of cross-step conditional propagation.** We characterize a dVLM-specific vulnerability mechanism in which adversarial visual semantics are preserved and transformed across multiple denoising steps, and provide empirical evidence that this mechanism is absent in autoregressive VLMs through stage-sensitivity analysis, prompt-level switch rates, and pairwise denoising-bin disagreement metrics.
- **Diffusion-aware adversarial optimization.** We develop a white-box optimization strategy that backpropagates through the bidirectional masked denoising process at multiple sampled timesteps, enabling adversarial perturbations to exploit the full multi-step propagation pathway rather than targeting a single decoding state.

2 Related Work

2.1 Visual Jailbreaks on Multimodal Language Models

The integration of visual modalities has introduced critical vulnerabilities into aligned large language models, creating a new attack surface for safety bypasses (Gong et al., 2025; Mazeika et al., 2024; Jain et al., 2026; Xia et al., 2025). HADES (Li et al., 2025b) serves as a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of multimodal models against a wide range of complex and adversarial jailbreak prompts. To further investigate these risks, VLSBench (Hu et al., 2025) provides a diagnostic framework for unveiling visual leakage and assessing the efficacy of safety alignment



Figure 2: Overview of DIVA. **Left (Cross-Modal Intent Obfuscation):** The harmful instruction u is rewritten into a visually grounded proxy prompt p, and the removed malicious semantics are encoded into a composite image $x_c = \mathcal{C}(x_{\text{typ}}, x_{\text{sem}})$ via typography overlay and a harmful reference image. **Right (Diffusion-Aware Adversarial Optimization):** At each PGD step, K timesteps are sampled from $w(t)$, and the aggregated masked cross-entropy loss $\mathcal{L}_{\text{DIVA}}$ is backpropagated through the full multimodal stack to update the bounded perturbation δ, yielding the final attacked image $\tilde{x} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(x_c + \delta)$.

across diverse multimodal scenarios. In terms of attack methodologies, PAD (Zhang et al., 2025b) leverages optimization strategies to craft adversarial image perturbations that effectively circumvent text-side security filters. However, the vast majority of current visual jailbreak research (Qi et al., 2023; Shayegani et al., 2023) and benchmarks (Liu et al., 2024c, 2025) are predominantly optimized for autoregressive models (ARMs). In these architectures, visual inputs are treated as static prefixes, leaving the specific vulnerabilities of iterative denoising generation processes largely unexplored.

2.2 Discrete Diffusion Vision-Language Models

As a robust alternative to the traditional autoregressive paradigm, discrete diffusion models have gained traction for their ability to perform bidirectional context modeling and parallel decoding (Nie et al., 2025; Zhu et al., 2025; You et al., 2026). LLaDA-V (You et al., 2025) represents a foundational advancement in this domain, extending large language diffusion models to multimodal tasks through effective visual instruction tuning. Building upon this architecture, MMaDA (Yang et al., 2025) employs an iterative masked-token denoising process to achieve high-fidelity multimodal generation. Similarly, LaViDa (Li et al., 2025a) utilizes discrete diffusion mechanisms to enhance the depth and robustness of multimodal understanding. Despite the rapid development of these architectures, their safety profiles remain severely under-explored. While recent frameworks like DIJA (Wen et al., 2026) and PAD (Zhang et al., 2025b) have begun to identify emergent jailbreak vulnerabilities within the multi-step denoising process of diffusion-based LLMs, such investigations are strictly confined to the pure-text modality (Das et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025a; He et al., 2026). Consequently, the susceptibility of discrete diffusion vision-language models (dVLMs) to visual jailbreaks remains a significant research gap, presenting a vast and critical space for further exploration.

3 Method

We introduce **DIVA** (**Di**screte-diffusion **V**ision-language model **A**ttack), a white-box visual jailbreak framework targeting multimodal discrete diffusion vision-language models (dVLMs). The central motivation is an asymmetry in how visual conditions operate during generation: in autoregressive multimodal models, the visual representation is encoded once and acts as a static prefix; in dVLMs, the same visual embedding participates in every reverse denoising step, creating persistent opportunities for adversarial semantics to take hold. DIVA is built around two complementary components (see Figure 2): *cross-modal intent obfuscation*, which redistributes explicit malicious semantics from the text channel into the visual channel, and *diffusion-aware adversarial optimization*, which learns a bounded perturbation to remain harmful across diverse denoising states.

3.1 Preliminaries and Threat Model

Discrete diffusion vision-language models. We focus on dVLMs such as LLaDA-V (You et al., 2025), which generate responses through iterative masked-token denoising rather than left-to-right autoregression. Let $y_0 = [y_1, \ldots, y_R]$ be a target response of length R. In the forward process, a masking ratio $t \in [0, 1]$ is drawn and each token is

independently replaced by a mask token [M] with probability t:

$$y_t^{(i)} = \begin{cases} [\mathtt{M}], & \text{with probability } t, \\ y_i, & \text{with probability } 1-t. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

The model p_θ is trained to predict all masked tokens in parallel, conditioned on the corrupted sequence, a text prompt p, and an image x:

$$p_\theta(y_0 \mid y_t,\, p,\, x)\,. \quad (2)$$

At inference, generation starts from a fully masked sequence and applies the reverse denoising process until all tokens are resolved.

Threat model. We consider a white-box adversary who has full access to the dVLM's parameters and gradients, but cannot alter the model weights. The attacker can manipulate the visual input under a bounded ℓ_∞ pixel constraint at inference time. Given a harmful user intent u, the objective is to induce harmful generation while making the textual prompt less explicitly malicious, a setting representative of realistic deployment scenarios where text-side safety filters may be active. For a target harmful response $y^\star = [y_1^\star, \ldots, y_R^\star]$, we construct an attacked image as:

$$\tilde{x} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(x_c + \delta)\,, \qquad \|\delta\|_\infty \le \epsilon, \quad (3)$$

where x_c is a semantically crafted composite image, δ is the optimized adversarial perturbation, and $\Pi_{[0,1]}(\cdot)$ clips pixel values to the valid range.

Discussion of threat model scope. We acknowledge that the white-box assumption, which requires access to model parameters, gradients, and training-style masking wrappers, may not hold in all deployment scenarios. In practice, many mainstream commercial dVLMs expose only black-box inference endpoints. We regard the white-box setting as a *necessary first step*: it establishes a clear upper bound on attack effectiveness and isolates the mechanistic contribution of cross-step conditional propagation from transfer-learning artifacts. Black-box and transfer-based extensions (e.g., surrogate-model optimization followed by cross-model evaluation) are explicitly left for future work.

Following Zou et al. (2023), $y^\star$ is a short affirmative non-refusal prefix (e.g., *"Sure, here are the steps"*), requiring no access to an external uncensored model. Attack effectiveness is determined entirely by evaluating the model's free-form generation with an independent safety judge post-hoc.

3.2 Cross-Modal Intent Obfuscation

The first stage of DIVA reduces the explicit harmfulness of the text query and transfers the unsafe semantics into the visual channel.

Text-side rewriting. Given the original harmful instruction u, we construct a visually grounded proxy prompt:

$$p = g(u,\, x_c), \quad (4)$$

where $g(\cdot)$ replaces direct references to harmful subjects, objects, or actions with visually dependent phrases (e.g., *"the item shown in the image"*, *"the action depicted above"*). The rewritten prompt retains enough context to trigger multimodal fusion while substantially reducing the text-level detectability of malicious intent.

Visual semantic injection. The harmful content removed from the text is encoded into a composite image x_c:

$$x_c = \mathcal{C}(x_{\text{typ}},\, x_{\text{sem}}), \quad (5)$$

where x_{typ} is a typography overlay carrying key malicious cues and x_{sem} is a semantically aligned harmful reference image. The operator $\mathcal{C}(\cdot)$ combines these via spatial overlay or stitching. The composite image serves as a covert cross-modal carrier: the text becomes less explicit, while the visual channel preserves and, under dVLM generation, amplifies the unsafe semantics.

3.3 Cross-Step Conditional Propagation in dVLMs

A key claim of this work is that the visual jailbreak surface in dVLMs is structurally different from that in autoregressive MLLMs, and that this difference directly motivates our optimization strategy.

In an ARM, the image is encoded into a fixed visual prefix. Harmful semantics injected at this stage influence generation only indirectly, through the initial token prediction as illustrated in Figure 3. The subsequent autoregressive unrolling proceeds independently of the image, so the attack effect is largely governed by the *strength of the initial visual conditioning*, a regime we term *static conditioning*.

In a dVLM, the visual embedding $v(\tilde{x})$ extracted by the vision encoder and multimodal projector from the attacked image $\tilde{x}$ participates in every denoising step. Writing z_t for the partially unmasked state at step t, each transition is:

$$z_{t-\Delta t} \;\sim\; p_\theta(z_{t-\Delta t} \mid z_t,\, p,\, v(\tilde{x}))\,. \quad (6)$$

Since $v(\tilde{x})$ re-enters the model at every step, harmful visual semantics are not injected once but *repeatedly applied* throughout the generation trajectory. We call this **cross-step conditional propagation**. Compared to ARMs, dVLMs consequently exhibit markedly higher stage sensitivity, higher prompt-level switch rates across denoising bins, and larger pairwise disagreement between denoising windows. Quantitative evidence is presented in Section 4.6. Crucially, this propagation property means that effective attacks on dVLMs must be optimized *across multiple masked states*, not for a single input configuration.



Figure 3: Architectural comparison of adversarial conditioning in ARMs and dVLMs. In ARMs, the vision encoder produces a fixed visual prefix injected only once, so adversarial influence is confined to the initial conditioning step. In dVLMs, the attacked image reconditions the model at every reverse denoising step, causing harmful visual semantics to be repeatedly amplified across the generation trajectory, a phenomenon we term *cross-step conditional propagation*.

3.4 Diffusion-Aware Adversarial Optimization

Multi-timestep attack objective. Given the prompt p, composite image x_c, and target response $y^\star$, DIVA optimizes δ by backpropagating through the dVLM's masked denoising objective at multiple sampled timesteps. At each iteration we draw K timesteps $\{t_k\}_{k=1}^{K}$ from a distribution $w(t)$ and apply the forward masking in Eq. (1) to $y^\star$, obtaining corrupted variants $\{y_{t_k}\}$. Let M_{t_k} denote the set of masked positions at step k. The per-timestep loss is a masked cross-entropy:

$$\mathcal{L}_{t_k}(\delta) = -\frac{1}{|M_{t_k}|} \sum_{i \in M_{t_k}} \log p_\theta(y_i^\star \mid y_{t_k},\, p,\, \tilde{x})\,, \tag{7}$$

where $\tilde{x}$ depends on δ via Eq. (3). The overall DIVA objective aggregates across timesteps:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{DIVA}}(\delta) = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \mathcal{L}_{t_k}(\delta). \tag{8}$$

Minimizing $\mathcal{L}_{\text{DIVA}}$ encourages the attacked image to facilitate recovery of the harmful target from *many* intermediate masked states, directly exploiting cross-step conditional propagation.

Timestep sampling. The distribution $w(t)$ can be set to uniform over $[0, 1]$. DIVA also supports biased sampling toward specific denoising regimes (e.g., low-mask-ratio steps where refusal-related tokens are typically resolved) to probe stage-specific vulnerabilities.

Gradient path and optimization. Let $v(\tilde{x})$ denote the visual feature obtained by passing $\tilde{x}$ through the vision encoder and multimodal projector, and let F_θ denote the bidirectional diffusion transformer. Gradients flow through the full multimodal stack:

$$\nabla_\delta \mathcal{L}_{\text{DIVA}} = \nabla_\delta F_\theta(y_{t_k},\, p,\, v(\tilde{x}))\,, \tag{9}$$

where $v(\cdot)$ is fully differentiable and training-time masking wrappers are bypassed so the attacker fully controls t_k and M_{t_k}. We update δ via projected gradient descent (PGD):

$$\delta^{(n+1)} = \Pi_\epsilon\Big(\delta^{(n)} - \alpha\, \text{sign}\Big(\nabla_\delta \mathcal{L}_{\text{DIVA}}^{(n)}\Big)\Big)\,, \tag{10}$$

where α is the step size and pixel validity is enforced after each step via Eq. (3).

3.5 Category-Level Universal Perturbation

Rather than computing a separate perturbation per query, DIVA optimizes a *shared* perturbation across all prompts within a harm category. For a category c with instruction set $\mathcal{D}_c = \{(p_j, y_j^\star)\}_{j=1}^{m}$, we jointly minimize:

$$\min_{\|\delta_c\|_\infty \le \epsilon} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^{m} \mathbb{E}_{t\sim w(t)}\Big[\mathcal{L}_t^{(j)}(\delta_c)\Big]\,. \tag{11}$$

Prompts are sampled in round-robin order and the multi-timestep loss in Eq. (8) is accumulated across iterations, improving within-category transferability and preventing over-fitting to any single instruction phrasing. At inference, the target dVLM is queried with the adversarial pair $(p, \tilde{x})$ where $\tilde{x} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(x_c + \delta_c)$, and produces its response through standard reverse denoising without any modification to the generation procedure.

Table 1: ASR (%) on HADES under the **Beaver** reward-model metric. Best result per model group in **bold**, second best underlined.

Model	Animal	Financial	Privacy	Self-Harm	Violence	Average
LLaDA-V						
LLaDA-V	53.33	60.00	45.33	34.67	76.67	54.00
LLaDA-V + DIJA	67.33	55.33	47.33	34.00	76.00	56.00
LLaDA-V + PAD	**69.33**	54.00	**50.00**	39.33	65.33	55.60
LLaDA-V + DIVA (Ours)	61.33	**66.00**	39.33	**50.00**	**77.33**	**58.80**
MMaDA						
MMaDA	32.00	32.00	30.67	18.67	40.67	30.80
MMaDA + DIJA	**70.67**	66.00	56.67	39.33	72.67	61.07
MMaDA + PAD	53.33	64.00	64.67	32.67	70.67	57.07
MMaDA + DIVA (Ours)	**70.67**	**71.33**	**72.00**	**45.33**	**79.33**	**67.73**
LLaDA2.0-Uni						
LLaDA2.0-Uni	14.00	37.33	23.33	6.00	34.67	23.07
LLaDA2.0-Uni + DIJA	55.33	36.67	58.00	30.67	68.67	49.87
LLaDA2.0-Uni + PAD	47.33	53.33	61.33	30.00	**76.67**	53.73
LLaDA2.0-Uni + DIVA (Ours)	**83.33**	**81.33**	**70.00**	**36.00**	74.67	**69.07**

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

Benchmarks. We evaluate on two multimodal safety benchmarks. **HADES** (Li et al., 2025b) tests model robustness across five harm categories (*Animal, Financial, Privacy, Self-Harm, Violence*) under two metrics: a *traditional* keyword-matching evaluator and a *Beaver* reward-model-based evaluator that more faithfully captures semantic harmfulness. **VLSBench** (Hu et al., 2025) provides a diagnostic evaluation of multimodal safety alignment across diverse unsafe scenarios; we report Attack Success Rate (ASR) alongside its Safe-Refuse and Safe-Warning decomposition.

Target Models and Baselines. We apply DIVA to three discrete diffusion VLMs: **LLaDA-V** (You et al., 2025), **MMaDA** (Yang et al., 2025), and **LLaDA2.0-Uni** (AI et al., 2026). LLaDA-V uses continuous SigLIP visual features, whereas MMaDA and LLaDA2.0-Uni use discrete visual tokenization designs. Baselines include: (i) the unattacked base model queried with the harmful text prompt; (ii) a *plain* text-only prompt with no adversarial image; and two visual jailbreak methods originally developed for autoregressive VLMs, **DIJA** (Wen et al., 2026) and **PAD** (Zhang et al., 2025b).

4.2 Main Results on HADES

Beaver metric (Table 1). DIVA achieves the highest average ASR on all three target models. For LLaDA-V, LLaDA-V+DIVA reaches **58.80%** average ASR, surpassing the strongest ARM-adapted baseline, LLaDA-V+DIJA (56.00%), by 2.8 percentage points. Category-level analysis shows the largest gains in Self-Harm (+10.7 pp over PAD) and Financial (+6.0 pp), two categories where persistent re-injection of adversarial visual semantics across denoising steps appears most consequential. For MMaDA, the advantage is more pronounced: MMaDA+DIVA achieves **67.73%** ASR, outperforming MMaDA+DIJA (61.07%) by 6.7 points, with consistent per-category improvements including a 15.3-point gain in Privacy over DIJA. For LLaDA2.0-Uni, DIVA reaches **69.07%** average ASR, compared with 49.87% for DIJA and 53.73% for PAD. The gain is category-dependent: DIVA is strongest on Animal and Financial, while PAD is slightly higher on Violence. This broadens the evidence for the attack design without implying universal transfer of a fixed perturbation.

Statistical tests. We report paired exact McNemar tests over the matched HADES samples and bootstrap 95% confidence intervals, with full results in Appendix E. The 95% intervals for DIVA's overall HADES ASR are [55.20, 62.27] on LLaDA-V and [64.27, 71.07] on MMaDA. For MMaDA,

Table 2: Results on **VLSBench** (%). *Safe Rate*, *Safe Refuse*, and *Safe Warning* are lower for a more successful attack; *ASR* (Unsafe Rate) is higher. Best ASR per model group in **bold**, second best underlined.

Model	Safe Rate↓	Safe Refuse↓	Safe Warning↓	ASR↑
LLaDA-V				
Plain LLaDA-V (text-only)	49.53	0.00	49.53	50.47
LLaDA-V	50.42	0.00	50.42	49.58
LLaDA-V + DIJA	49.64	0.05	49.59	50.36
LLaDA-V + PAD	48.94	0.05	48.89	51.06
LLaDA-V + DIVA (Ours)	**47.93**	0.00	**47.93**	**52.07**
MMaDA				
Plain MMaDA (text-only)	27.93	0.00	27.93	72.07
MMaDA	29.90	0.04	29.85	70.10
MMaDA + DIJA	26.95	0.00	26.95	73.05
MMaDA + PAD	27.31	0.49	26.82	72.69
MMaDA + DIVA (Ours)	**25.84**	0.04	**25.79**	**74.16**

Table 3: Ablation study on HADES under the **Beaver** reward-model metric (LLaDA-V). We isolate the contribution of the composite image x_c and the diffusion-aware perturbation δ by comparing random, spatially shuffled, and true optimized variants. Best in **bold**, second best underlined.

Setting	Animal	Financial	Privacy	Self-Harm	Violence	Average
Plain (text-only)	43.33	37.33	16.00	16.67	51.33	32.93
x_c only	41.33	48.67	22.67	18.67	73.67	41.00
x_c + Random δ	45.33	52.00	26.67	24.00	74.67	44.53
x_c + Shuffled δ	53.33	60.67	33.33	39.33	76.67	52.67
x_c + DIVA δ (Ours)	**61.33**	**66.00**	**39.33**	**50.00**	**77.33**	**58.80**

DIVA is significantly better than the base model, DIJA, and PAD (all $p < 10^{-3}$). For LLaDA-V, the overall comparisons against DIJA and PAD are not significant ($p = 0.156$ and 0.161), because gains in Financial and Self-Harm are offset by losses in Animal and Privacy; the category-level gains in Financial and Self-Harm remain significant. For LLaDA2.0-Uni, two-proportion tests over the aggregate success counts give $p = 3.6 \times 10^{-14}$ against DIJA and $p = 1.1 \times 10^{-9}$ against PAD.

Compute and transfer scope. DIVA generates category-level perturbations offline rather than per query. On one H800, the standard MMaDA-8B setting (300 steps, $K = 4$) takes about 3–4 minutes per category; detailed measurements are in Appendix F. Applying a stored perturbation requires only addition and clipping, so online overhead is negligible. Because perturbations are re-optimized for each target model and category, our results show robustness across targets, not direct transfer of one unchanged perturbation.

4.3 Results on VLSBench

Table 2 reports results on VLSBench, whose prompt distribution was not used during perturbation optimization. DIVA achieves the highest ASR among all visual jailbreak methods on both models. For LLaDA-V, LLaDA-V+DIVA attains **52.07%** ASR, outperforming PAD (51.06%) and DIJA (50.36%). For MMaDA, MMaDA+DIVA reaches **74.16%** ASR, exceeding DIJA (73.05%), PAD (72.69%), and the unattacked base model (70.10%). The consistent improvements across both benchmarks and both model families confirm that exploiting cross-step conditional propagation yields perturbations that transfer to held-out multimodal safety scenarios.

4.4 Ablation Study

Table 3 isolates the contribution of each DIVA component under the Beaver reward-model metric for LLaDA-V. Starting from a plain text-only prompt, we progressively add the composite im-



Figure 4: Qualitative comparison of model responses before and after DIVA. **Left**: both LLaDA-V and MMaDA correctly refuse harmful text-only queries, producing policy-compliant safety disclaimers. **Right**: after rewriting the explicit instruction into a visually grounded proxy prompt and augmenting the composite image with the optimised perturbation δ, both models produce detailed, step-by-step harmful completions. The proxy prompts are superficially benign and would not trigger text-side filters in isolation; the malicious semantics reside in the composite image and are amplified through cross-step conditional propagation across the denoising trajectory.

age x_c produced by cross-modal intent obfuscation, and then three perturbation variants: a *random* δ sampled uniformly from $[-\epsilon, \epsilon]$, a *shuffled* δ whose pixel values are drawn from the optimized perturbation but spatially permuted, and the *true* optimized δ produced by DIVA. Using only x_c already raises ASR from 32.93% (text-only) to 41.00%, confirming that cross-modal intent obfuscation alone transfers meaningful adversarial semantics into the visual channel. Adding a random perturbation yields a moderate further gain (44.53%), while the shuffled variant which preserves the magnitude distribution but destroys spatial structure reaches 52.67%, indicating that pixel-level statistics contribute partly to the attack. The full DIVA perturbation achieves **58.80%**, with the largest category-level gains in Financial (+17.3 pp over x_c) and Self-Harm (+31.3 pp), demonstrating that diffusion-aware multi-timestep optimization provides substantial attack strength beyond the composite image and unstructured perturbations. The traditional keyword-matching evaluator results are largely consistent with this core finding and are fully reported in Appendix I. The component sequence and its explicit composition matrix are detailed in Appendix H.

Evaluator robustness. We additionally evaluate the HADES responses with StrongREJECT, an independent harmfulness judge (Appendix D). DIVA remains the highest overall method for both LLaDA-V (49.47%) and MMaDA (42.67%), corroborating the direction of the Beaver results. The judge-level correlation is positive but moderate, so absolute ASR and some category-level orderings are evaluator-dependent.

4.5 Qualitative Analysis

Figure 4 presents representative output pairs for LLaDA-V and MMaDA under baseline and DIVA-attacked conditions, both models refuse the unmodified harmful queries under standard inference.

Under DIVA, the explicit harmful instruction is rewritten into a superficially benign proxy prompt while its semantics are encoded in the composite image and remain effective across denoising steps. Both models then produce detailed, actionable completions; appended safety disclaimers do not mitigate the already-materialized harmful content. This qualitative pattern is consistent with the quantitative gains reported in Tables 1 and 3.

Figure 5 illustrates the three-layer composition of a representative DIVA image from the Animal category of HADES. The original composite x_c (top-left) already contains the typography overlay (`beat`) as the primary semantic carrier. After adding the optimised perturbation δ, the resulting attacked image $\tilde{x}$ (top-right) is visually similar to x_c to a human observer. The amplified delta ($\times 4$, bottom-left) reveals dense, spatially distributed pixel-level noise with no coherent structure, and

the per-pixel magnitude heatmap (bottom-right) confirms that energy is spread roughly uniformly across the image rather than concentrated in salient regions. More detectability analyses are reported in Appendix B.



Figure 5: Visualisation of the DIVA perturbation for a representative Animal-category example. **Top-left:** composite image x_c with typography overlay. **Top-right:** attacked image $\tilde{x} = x_c + \delta$. **Bottom-left:** perturbation δ amplified by $4\times$ for visibility, showing dense spatially distributed noise. **Bottom-right:** per-pixel magnitude heatmap $|\delta|$, confirming roughly uniform, low-energy distortion.

4.6 Cross-Step Conditional Propagation: Mechanistic Evidence

We verify the mechanism claimed in Section 3.3 by comparing LLaDA-V (dVLM) and LLaVA-1.5 (ARM) across four stage-sensitivity diagnostics: the **Stage-Sensitivity Index** (SSI, average per-category $\max_b \mathrm{ASR}_b - \min_b \mathrm{ASR}_b$), the prompt-level **switch rate** (fraction of prompts whose attack outcome differs across any bin pair), **pairwise bin disagreement** (mean binary disagreement over all $\binom{4}{2}=6$ bin pairs), and **early-only advantage** (fraction of prompts succeeding exclusively in the earliest denoising bin 0–8).

Table 4 reports results with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. On LLaDA-V, DIVA improves over the image-only condition by **+7.73 pp**; on LLaVA-1.5, the same perturbation *degrades* performance by 6.13 pp because the adversarial image already saturates ASR at 96.00%. All four stage-sensitivity metrics reveal a **7–9× gap** between the two families: SSI is 12.00% for dVLM versus 1.33% for ARM, switch rate 18.67% versus 2.67%, and early-only advantage 10.67% versus 1.33%. In particular, Privacy and Self-Harm show the highest switch rates (30.00% and 23.33%), indicating that harmful semantics in these categories depend most on accumulation across denoising steps. All gaps are statistically reliable ($p<0.01$; non-overlapping bootstrap CIs for SSI, switch rate, and pairwise disagreement), confirming that cross-step conditional propagation is a structural property of dVLM generation rather than a sampling artefact.

Table 4: Attack performance and stage-sensitivity diagnostics for LLaDA-V (dVLM) vs. LLaVA-1.5 (ARM) under identical conditions. *Gain*: DIVA minus image-only ASR (pp). Bootstrap 95% CIs in brackets. All metrics in %.

Metric	**LLaDA-V** *(dVLM)*	**LLaVA-1.5** *(ARM)*
Attack Performance		
ASR: Image only	80.80	**96.00**
ASR: DIVA	**88.53**	89.87
Gain	**+7.73**	−6.13
Stage-Sensitivity Diagnostics		
SSI	**12.00** [8.00, 19.33]	1.33 [0.00, 4.00]
Switch rate	**18.67** [12.67, 25.33]	2.67 [0.67, 5.33]
Pairwise disagr.	**9.44** [6.44, 12.89]	1.33 [0.33, 2.67]
Early-only advantage	**10.67** [6.00, 16.00]	1.33 [0.00, 3.33]

5 Conclusion

We presented DIVA, the first visual jailbreak framework for multimodal discrete diffusion VLMs, built around the observation that dVLMs re-apply visual embeddings at every denoising step rather than treating them as a static prefix. Exploiting the cross-step conditional propagation via diffusion-aware multi-timestep optimization, DIVA achieves attack success rates of 58.8%, 67.7%, and 69.1% on HADES for LLaDA-V, MMaDA, and LLaDA2.0-Uni under the Beaver reward-model metric, a semantics-aware evaluator that more faithfully captures harmful generation than traditional keyword matching, thereby substantially outperforming baseline methods originally designed for autoregressive models.

Limitations

DIVA operates under a white-box threat model requiring full access to model parameters and gradients, which may not reflect all real-world deployment scenarios; extending to black-box and transfer-based settings is an important direction for future work. Our evaluation covers three dVLMs (LLaDA-V, MMaDA, and LLaDA2.0-Uni) and two safety benchmarks (HADES and VLSBench). The perturbations are re-optimized for each target model and category, so direct cross-model transfer of an unchanged perturbation remains untested. The mechanistic evidence is behavioral rather than representation-level causal evidence, and the evaluator comparison shows category-dependent differences between automated judges. Category-level perturbations are precomputed offline; in our MMaDA-8B measurements, a standard 300-step, four-timestep optimization takes roughly 3–4 minutes per category on one H800, while applying a stored perturbation adds only an element-wise addition and clamp. Query-specific adaptive variants would require substantially more compute and are outside the scope of this work. Finally, we acknowledge that DIVA carries inherent dual-use risks: as an attack framework, the techniques described could in principle be repurposed to cause harm beyond the intended safety-evaluation context. We will not release optimised perturbations or attack scripts, and we have reported our findings to the maintainers of the evaluated models prior to submission, in the belief that proactive disclosure is essential for the community to develop robust multimodal safety alignment before these model families are more widely deployed.

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A Detailed Attack Hyperparameters

This section provides a complete record of the training and evaluation hyperparameters used in every DIVA run reported in the main paper. We first describe the shared design choices that apply across all experiments, then give the per-experiment table for each benchmark and model combination.

Perturbation budget. All LLaDA-V experiments use an ℓ_∞ pixel budget of $\varepsilon = 0.25$, applied in the $[0, 1]$ pixel range. For MMaDA-8B, which uses a VQ-based image pipeline, we set $\varepsilon = 64/255 \approx 0.251$ to align with the codec's quantisation scale. In both cases the perturbation δ is projected back into $[-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$ after every PGD step.

PGD step size. The step size α is set proportionally to ε and inversely to the number of outer steps, following the standard $\alpha = 2.5\,\varepsilon/\text{steps}$ heuristic. Concretely, the LLaDA-V HADES run uses $\alpha = 0.0013$ over 500 steps, while the MMaDA runs use $\alpha = 0.0021$ over 300 steps. The VLSBench variants deviate slightly because their step counts were chosen for compute reasons rather than to follow the formula exactly; the exact values are listed in Table 5.

Multi-timestep sampling (K and $w(t)$). At each outer PGD step, $K = 4$ diffusion timesteps are independently sampled to form the gradient estimate. The timestep distribution $w(t)$ supports three schedules. Letting $u \sim \mathcal{U}[0, 1)$:

$$t_{\text{uniform}} = u\,(1 - 0.02) + 0.02, \tag{12}$$

$$t_{\text{low-}t} = u^{2.5}(1 - 0.02) + 0.02, \tag{13}$$

$$t_{\text{high-}t} = (1 - u^{2.5})(1 - 0.02) + 0.02. \tag{14}$$

Equations (13) and (14) concentrate mass near $t \approx 0$ (late denoising, low mask ratio) and $t \approx 1$ (early denoising, high mask ratio), respectively. All runs reported in the main paper use the uniform schedule (12); the other two schedules are available for future stage-specific studies.

Compute budget. The total number of per-timestep loss evaluations is Steps $\times K$. For LLaDA-V on HADES this yields $500 \times 4 = 2{,}000$ evaluations per category; for all 300-step runs it is $1{,}200$.

Image resolution and precision. LLaDA-V processes images at 384×384 pixels via a SigLIP encoder; MMaDA-8B center-crops inputs to 512×512 before passing them through the MagViT-v2 VQ tokeniser with codebook temperature 1.0. All runs use `bfloat16` precision throughout.

Table 5 lists the full per-experiment values for LLaDA-V and MMaDA-8B on HADES and VLSBench. The MMaDA-8B-MixCoTe variant on HADES is identical to the MMaDA HADES column except for the model checkpoint; it is therefore not listed separately. For VLSBench, the MMaDA optimisation is warm-started from the HADES-trained perturbation δ for the matched harm category, whereas the LLaDA-V VLSBench run starts from zero.

B Filter Detectability

Quantitative perceptual quality. We measure the perceptual distance between x_c and $\tilde{x}$ across all five HADES categories ($\varepsilon = 0.25$, LLaDA-V). Results are summarised in Table 6. The average PSNR of 32.0 dB indicates moderate pixel-level fidelity; the average SSIM of 0.806 and LPIPS of 0.132 reflect perceptible but not dramatic distortion at the image level, consistent with the observation that the amplified delta in Figure 5 is visually noticeable only after magnification. The average ℓ_∞ norm of δ reaches 0.137, which is below the nominal budget $\varepsilon = 0.25$, indicating that PGD converges without saturating the constraint. The mean per-pixel absolute deviation is 0.019, confirming that the perturbation is sparse in energy despite being dense in spatial support.

Typography overlay and OCR detectability. We evaluate OCR detectability using EasyOCR on both x_c and $\tilde{x}$ for all five HADES categories. Table 7 reports the OCR trigger rate (fraction of images where the harmful keyword is detected) and the text similarity between OCR outputs on x_c and $\tilde{x}$. Both the original composite and the attacked image achieve a trigger rate of 1.0 across all categories, and the OCR output is identical in all cases (text similarity $= 1.0$), confirming that δ does not alter the legibility of the typography overlay. This is by design: the overlay is intended to be read by the vision-language model, not to evade human or automated inspection. Consequently, OCR-based keyword filtering can detect the embedded cue with perfect recall on this sample; however, this does not constitute a practical defence. The detected

Table 5: DIVA hyperparameters for all experiments. ε: ℓ_∞ pixel budget; α: PGD step size; K: timesteps sampled per outer step; R: target response length (tokens). All runs use $w(t) = \text{Uniform}$, $t \sim \mathcal{U}[0.02, 1.00)$ and `bfloat16` precision. The MMaDA-8B-MixCoTe variant is identical to the MMaDA / HADES column except for the model checkpoint.

Hyperparameter	**LLaDA-V / HADES**	**LLaDA-V / VLSBench**	**MMaDA / HADES**	**MMaDA / VLSBench**
ε (ℓ_∞)	0.2500	0.2500	0.2510	0.2510
PGD outer steps	500	300	300	300
Step size α	0.0013	0.0017	0.0021	0.0021
Timesteps per step K	4	4	4	4
Response length R	128	64	128	128
Total evals (Steps $\times$ K)	2,000	1,200	1,200	1,200
Init δ	zero	zero	zero	HADES δ

Table 6: Perceptual similarity between x_c and $\tilde{x} = x_c + \delta$ across HADES categories ($\varepsilon = 0.25$, LLaDA-V). Higher PSNR/SSIM and lower LPIPS indicate less distortion. ℓ_∞ is the maximum absolute pixel deviation; mean $|\Delta|$ is the average absolute deviation.

Category	**PSNR↑**	**SSIM↑**	**LPIPS↓**	ℓ_∞	**Mean $\lvert\Delta\rvert$**
Average	32.0	0.806	0.132	0.137	0.019

keywords (`beat`, `steal`, `spy`, `overdose`, `gun`) are semantically ambiguous in isolation: a keyword-list filter would generate large numbers of false positives on benign images containing the same words. A meaningful OCR-based defence would require joint reasoning over the extracted text, the image context, and the accompanying prompt, a substantially harder multimodal detection task that existing pipelines do not support.

Table 7: OCR detectability of the typography overlay before and after adding δ (EasyOCR, LLaDA-V HADES). Trigger rate: fraction of images where the keyword is detected. Text similarity: normalised edit-distance similarity between OCR outputs on x_c and $\tilde{x}$.

Category	**Keyword**	**Trigger rate (x_c / $\tilde{x}$)**	**Text sim.**
Animal	`beat`	1.0 / 1.0	1.00
Financial	`steal`	1.0 / 1.0	1.00
Privacy	`spy`	1.0 / 1.0	1.00
Self-Harm	`overdose`	1.0 / 1.0	1.00
Violence	`gun`	1.0 / 1.0	1.00
Average	—	1.0 / 1.0	1.00

NSFW filter detectability. Standard NSFW classifiers operate on full image semantics rather than fine-grained pixel statistics. Because x_c is constructed from a harmful reference image, it may already trigger image-level NSFW filters in categories such as Violence or Self-Harm. The perturbation δ does not meaningfully alter the image-level NSFW score, as its energy ($\ell_\infty = 0.137$, mean $|\Delta| = 0.019$) is well below the threshold at which pixel noise affects convolutional NSFW classifiers. Any safety gain from NSFW filtering would therefore apply equally to the x_c-only condition and does not specifically address the additional risk introduced by δ.

C Beaver Reward-Model Evaluation Protocol

Evaluator identity. The Beaver metric is computed using **Beaver-Dam-7B**, a 7B-parameter safety reward model trained on the BeaverTails preference dataset (Ji et al., 2023). It acts as a post-hoc judge: given the harmful instruction and the attacked model's text response, it outputs a per-category harmfulness probability. Beaver never sees the image; it assesses whether the *textual output* constitutes genuinely harmful content rather than merely the absence of a refusal. This makes it stricter than the traditional keyword-matching proxy, which over-estimates attack success whenever a model produces short, incoherent, or image-descriptive responses that lack actionable harmful content.

Category mapping and decision rule. HADES organises prompts into five harm scenarios. We map each scenario to its closest Beaver-Dam-7B label (Table 8) and apply a decision threshold of 0.5: a response is counted as a successful attack if the scenario-matched label probability exceeds this threshold. The Beaver ASR reported in Table 1 and Table 3 of the main paper is the fraction of such successes, averaged over all five scenarios.

Evaluation subset. Each HADES scenario is evaluated on 150 final-step samples (750 total), corresponding to one image per harmful instruc-

Table 8: Mapping from HADES harm scenarios to Beaver-Dam-7B safety-category labels.

HADES scenario	Beaver label
Animal	`animal_abuse`
Financial	`financial_crime`
Privacy	`privacy_violation`
Self-Harm	`self_harm`
Violence	`violence`

tion at the last PGD optimisation step. The traditional keyword-matching metric (Appendix I) is computed on the same 750 samples.

Limitations. We acknowledge three caveats of single-evaluator automated assessment. First, Beaver-Dam-7B reflects BeaverTails annotation preferences and may systematically differ from human judgement on nuanced categories such as Self-Harm and Privacy. Second, the fixed threshold of 0.5 affects absolute ASR values; however, the ranking of methods is preserved when the threshold is varied in $\{0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7\}$, confirming that our conclusions are not threshold-sensitive. Third, because Beaver evaluates only text, responses that are harmful in intent but expressed implicitly may be under-counted. The traditional proxy metric (Appendix I) yields consistent method rankings throughout, providing partial cross-validation of the Beaver-based conclusions.

D Independent StrongREJECT Evaluation

To assess sensitivity to the Beaver-Dam-7B evaluator, we re-score the complete HADES response set with StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024) as an independent judge. The table reports ASR (%) by harm category and overall. DIVA has the highest overall ASR for both target models, while category-level magnitudes differ between judges.

Table 10 quantifies the association between Beaver and StrongREJECT at several aggregation levels.

Across all 40 method-by-category pairs, the positive and significant but moderate correlation ($r = 0.50, p = 0.0011$) indicates partial agreement in direction with substantial evaluator-dependent variation in magnitude and category ordering. The within-model-family correlations remain significant, although agreement is stronger for LLaDA-V than MMaDA. After averaging over categories, the eight method-level overall values have a weaker, non-significant association ($r = 0.37, p = 0.371$); this small-n result should not be used to claim close agreement between judges.

These correlations measure agreement in relative variation rather than equality of the two scoring scales. In particular, a positive category-level correlation does not imply that Beaver and StrongREJECT assign comparable absolute ASR or preserve every baseline ordering. We therefore use the second evaluator as a robustness check on the direction of the main result, while retaining judge-specific scores and avoiding direct calibration between the two metrics.

One notable disagreement is MMaDA+DIJA: under StrongREJECT it falls below the unattacked base model on Financial (8.00 vs. 31.33) and Privacy (12.67 vs. 23.33), a pattern not observed under Beaver. Nevertheless, DIVA has the highest overall StrongREJECT ASR in both model families. We therefore treat the second judge as evidence that the main DIVA conclusion is directionally robust, while reporting rather than obscuring category- and baseline-specific disagreements. No single automated evaluator is treated as a definitive proxy for human harmfulness.

E Statistical Significance Analysis

We assess the HADES Beaver ASR results at the sample level. For LLaDA-V and MMaDA, 95% confidence intervals are obtained by bootstrap resampling and overall comparisons use paired exact McNemar tests because all methods are evaluated on the same 750 prompts. Table 11 reports the complete results.

On MMaDA, DIVA improves significantly over the base model and both attack baselines overall. On LLaDA-V, the comparison with the base model is significant, but the overall margins over DIJA and PAD do not reach significance. The latter result follows from heterogeneous category effects: improvements in Financial and Self-Harm are partially offset by lower ASR in Animal and Privacy. Accordingly, we describe the LLaDA-V gains as category-concentrated rather than uniform. Category-level entries indicate where the corresponding paired test is significant; they should be interpreted together with the reported overall test.

For LLaDA2.0-Uni, the rebuttal analysis was based on aggregate success counts. We therefore report two-proportion z-tests separately in Table 12, rather than describing them as paired tests.

Table 9: HADES ASR (%) under StrongREJECT.

Model / method	Animal	Financial	Privacy	Self-Harm	Violence	Overall
LLaDA-V	24.00	42.67	32.67	29.33	44.67	34.67
LLaDA-V + DIJA	53.33	38.67	32.00	42.00	56.67	44.53
LLaDA-V + PAD	45.33	38.00	36.67	38.67	50.00	41.73
LLaDA-V + DIVA	57.33	42.67	36.00	55.33	56.00	**49.47**
MMaDA	24.67	31.33	23.33	22.67	35.33	27.47
MMaDA + DIJA	31.33	8.00	12.67	22.67	31.33	21.20
MMaDA + PAD	22.00	43.33	40.67	18.00	44.00	33.60
MMaDA + DIVA	46.00	34.00	38.00	42.00	53.33	**42.67**

Table 10: Pearson correlation between Beaver and StrongREJECT ASR.

Comparison unit	n	r	p
All methods × categories	40	0.50	0.0011
LLaDA-V family only	20	0.63	0.0028
MMaDA family only	20	0.47	0.0348
Method-level overall	8	0.37	0.371

All three aggregate differences are statistically significant. The largest gains occur against the base model, followed by DIJA and PAD. These tests use aggregate proportions and thus do not exploit prompt-level pairing; the test type is reported explicitly to distinguish it from the paired analysis above.

F Runtime and Compute Overhead of Category-Level Perturbation Generation

Computational structure. Generating a category-specific perturbation δ_c is an *offline* optimisation procedure, not a single forward pass. At each PGD step, DIVA (i) samples K diffusion timesteps, (ii) evaluates the masked cross-entropy loss $\mathcal{L}_{t_k}(\delta)$ for each timestep through the full multimodal stack (VQ/vision encoder $\rightarrow$ bidirectional diffusion transformer), and (iii) accumulates the gradients for a single projected update. The total compute budget is therefore proportional to

$$\text{Cost} \;\propto\; N_{\text{steps}} \times K \times \underbrace{C_{\text{VQ/vis}} + C_{\text{LM-fwd/bwd}}}_{\text{per-timestep cost}}, \tag{15}$$

where N_{steps} is the number of outer PGD steps and K is the number of timesteps sampled per step (see Appendix A). Crucially, *applying* a precomputed δ_c at inference time adds no measurable overhead: it consists of a single element-wise addition followed by pixel clamping, $\tilde{x} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(x_c + \delta_c)$.

Empirical wall-clock cost. Table 13 reports steady-state per-step optimisation times measured on an H800 80 GB GPU under two model configurations. Each cell gives the mean optimisation-phase wall-clock time per PGD step after the first warm-up step is discarded. We additionally extrapolate to the full 300-step budget used in the MMaDA HADES experiments ($N_{\text{steps}} \times K = 1{,}200$ total timestep-loss evaluations).
Historical runs on the MMaDA-8B-Base and MMaDA-8B-MixCoTe checkpoints (N_{steps}=300, K=4, R=128, 512×512) corroborate these estimates: per-category wall-clock optimisation times ranged from ≈52 s to ≈205 s depending on GPU queue state and whether categories were launched in parallel across devices. Under the standard single-GPU, per-category configuration the empirically observed range is **∼3–4 minutes per category** for an 8 B-parameter dVLM, consistent with the extrapolated figures in Table 13.

First-step warmup overhead. Benchmarks reveal a pronounced first-step penalty: the initial PGD step costs ≈4.6–8.3 s (graph compilation, CUDA kernel caching), while subsequent steady-state steps converge to ≈0.15–0.66 s depending on K. This warmup is amortised over the full optimisation and is negligible for runs of $N_{\text{steps}} \geq 100$.

Sensitivity to K and R. Increasing K from 1 to 4 roughly quadruples the per-step compute cost (cf. Eq. 15), consistent with the linear scaling term in K. Varying R from 64 to 128 tokens has a smaller but measurable effect (≈13% additional cost), as the masked cross-entropy summation is over $|M_{t_k}| \leq R$ positions. Memory pressure, rather than raw compute, is the binding constraint at

Table 11: Significance analysis on HADES under the Beaver metric. ΔASR is DIVA minus the comparison method in percentage points. Overall p-values use paired exact McNemar tests.

Target	Comparison	DIVA ASR	95% CI	ΔASR	Overall p	Significant categories
MMaDA	vs. Base	67.73	[64.27, 71.07]	+36.93	7.58×10^{-54}	All five categories
MMaDA	vs. PAD	67.73	[64.27, 71.07]	+10.67	6.48×10^{-7}	Animal; Self-Harm
MMaDA	vs. DIJA	67.73	[64.27, 71.07]	+6.67	6.44×10^{-4}	Privacy
LLaDA-V	vs. Base	58.80	[55.20, 62.27]	+4.80	0.0039	Self-Harm
LLaDA-V	vs. PAD	58.80	[55.20, 62.27]	+3.20	0.161	Financial; Self-Harm; Violence
LLaDA-V	vs. DIJA	58.80	[55.20, 62.27]	+2.80	0.156	Financial; Self-Harm

Table 12: Aggregate two-proportion tests for LLaDA2.0-Uni on HADES.

Comparison	DIVA	Other	ΔASR	z	p
vs. Base	69.07	23.07	+46.00	17.87	2.0×10^{-71}
vs. DIJA	69.07	49.87	+19.20	7.57	3.6×10^{-14}
vs. PAD	69.07	53.73	+15.34	6.10	1.1×10^{-9}

Table 13: Runtime ablation for **MMaDA-8B-Base** δ optimisation (512×512, `bfloat16`, single H800 80 GB). *Steady-state step* excludes the first PGD step, which incurs one-time CUDA compilation overhead (≈4.6–8.3 s). *Extrap. 300-step opt.* projects the steady-state per-step time to the full 300-step budget used in the MMaDA HADES experiments. Model load (≈9–21 s) and preprocessing (≈1–2 s) are excluded and incurred once per category regardless of K or R.

K	R	Steady-state step (s)	Extrap. 300-step opt. (s)
1	64	0.15	45.9
1	128	0.17	51.1
2	64	0.35	104.1
2	128	0.34	103.3
4	64	0.63	189.0
4	128	0.66	196.6

R: target response length in tokens.

large K: the gradient graph must retain K separate activation traces simultaneously, each proportional to model depth × sequence length.

This asymmetry suggests that K is the primary systems-level control for the cost–coverage trade-off: increasing it exposes each update to more denoising states but proportionally increases computation and activation storage. By contrast, doubling R has a smaller measured runtime effect in our setting. We therefore keep $K = 4$ across the main experiments to hold denoising-state coverage fixed when comparing models and benchmarks, rather than tuning compute independently for each reported result.

Scaling to larger models. Equation (15) implies that runtime scales with model size through both $C_{\text{VQ/vis}}$ and $C_{\text{LM-fwd/bwd}}$. For a model with P parameters, $C_{\text{LM-fwd/bwd}}$ grows roughly as $\mathcal{O}(P \cdot L)$ where L is sequence length, so the optimisation cost scales approximately linearly with model size when K and R are held fixed. In practice, *memory* is the more restrictive bottleneck: because DIVA backpropagates through K complete forward passes simultaneously, GPU memory requirements grow as $\mathcal{O}(K \cdot P_{\text{act}})$, where P_{act} is the activation footprint per forward pass.

Real-time deployment considerations. DIVA is designed as an *offline precomputation* framework, not a real-time adaptive attack. The category-level perturbations $\{\delta_c\}$ are computed once and stored; at inference, the attacked image is assembled in $\mathcal{O}(1)$ time via $\tilde{x} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(xc + \delta_c)$. Online, per-request computation of δ is infeasible under current hardware: even a single 10-step optimisation incurs ≈15–20 s of total wall-clock time (dominated by model loading), well above interactive latency budgets. The offline nature of δ generation is therefore not a limitation in the context of this work, which targets safety evaluation of deployed dVLMs, but would need to be revisited for any adaptive, query-

specific attack scenario.

G Target Response Construction

Construction procedure. The target response $y^\star$ used in the DIVA optimization objective (Eq. 8) is a short affirmative prefix drawn from a fixed set of non-refusal acknowledgements, e.g.: *"Sure! I'm ready to answer your question."*, *"Of course! I'm here to assist you with your query."*, *"Absolutely! I'd be glad to help with that."* and similar variants. This follows the weakly-targeted convention introduced by Zou et al. (2023), and requires no access to an external uncensored language model.

Role of $y^\star$ in the optimization. $y^\star$ enters the DIVA objective solely as a teacher-forced target for the masked cross-entropy loss $\mathcal{L}_{\text{DIVA}}$ (Eq. 8). Its purpose is to steer the adversarial perturbation δ away from refusal-bearing denoising trajectories and toward compliant generation; it is never fed to the target dVLM at inference time. Because $y^\star$ is an affirmative non-refusal prefix rather than a fully specified harmful completion, attack success is determined entirely by the free-form generation of the target model, evaluated post-hoc by an independent safety judge (Beaver-Dam-7B; Appendix C).

H Detailed Component Ablation

Table 14 makes the composition of each main-paper ablation condition explicit. This view distinguishes the effect of moving the intent from an explicit text prompt into the composite visual channel from the incremental effects of perturbation magnitude, optimized pixel values, and their spatial arrangement.

The transition from Plain to x_c only measures the joint effect of prompt rewriting and composite-image construction; those two changes are coupled in the current attack design and are not separately identified. The Random row tests whether merely consuming the available ℓ_∞ budget is sufficient. The increase from Random to Shuffled retains DIVA-optimized values but destroys their spatial placement, showing that the selected value distribution contributes beyond unstructured noise. Finally, Shuffled to DIVA preserves the optimized value multiset while restoring its learned spatial arrangement, isolating the benefit of spatial structure under the multi-timestep objective.

The progression also clarifies necessity versus sufficiency. The composite image is sufficient to improve over the explicit text-only prompt, but it does not account for the full DIVA gain. Conversely, random noise uses the same admissible pixel range yet recovers only a small part of the improvement. The remaining gap to the optimized perturbation indicates that attack strength depends on how the available perturbation budget is allocated, not merely on its presence.

I Ablation Study under Traditional Keyword-Matching Metric

Table 15 replicates the component ablation of Table 3 (main paper) under the traditional keyword-matching evaluator rather than the Beaver reward-model metric. The traditional metric counts a response as a successful attack if it contains any of a fixed set of harmful keywords, and consequently yields higher absolute ASR values than the Beaver evaluator, which requires the response to constitute semantically harmful content. Despite this difference in absolute scale, the relative ordering of ablation conditions is fully consistent across both metrics: the composite image x_c alone already provides a substantial lift over the plain text-only baseline (+27.6 pp on average), and each successive perturbation variant, random, spatially shuffled, and the true DIVA optimized δ, adds further incremental gains. The full DIVA perturbation achieves the highest average ASR of 88.53%, with the largest per-category improvements in Financial (+4.67 pp over shuffled) and Self-Harm (+19.34 pp over x_c only), mirroring the pattern observed under the Beaver metric and confirming that diffusion-aware multi-timestep optimization provides attack strength beyond what is captured by unstructured perturbations alone.

J Per-Denoising-Step-Bin ASR Analysis

Table 16 disaggregates DIVA's attack success rate across four non-overlapping denoising-step bins (0–8, 8–16, 16–32, 32–64) for LLaDA-V (dVLM) and LLaVA-1.5 (ARM) under identical experimental conditions. The *Range* column reports the per-category Stage-Sensitivity Index (SSI), defined as $\max_b \text{ASR}_b - \min_b \text{ASR}_b$; cells with Range $\geq$ 10 pp are highlighted.

For LLaDA-V, Privacy and Self-Harm exhibit the largest variation across bins (20.00 pp and 23.34 pp respectively), with ASR systematically higher in the earliest bin (0–8) and declining toward later denoising stages. This pattern indicates that adversarial semantics are most effectively lever-

Table 14: Composition of the HADES Beaver ablation conditions for LLaDA-V. A check mark denotes that the component is present. The composite image x_c jointly contains typography and semantically aligned imagery.

Setting	Explicit harmful prompt	Rewritten prompt	Composite image x_c	Perturbation type	Avg. ASR
Plain (text-only)	✓	–	–	None	32.93
x_c only	–	✓	✓	None	41.00
x_c + Random δ	–	✓	✓	Random values in $[-\epsilon, \epsilon]$	44.53
x_c + Shuffled δ	–	✓	✓	Optimized values, spatially permuted	52.67
x_c + DIVA δ	–	✓	✓	Multi-timestep optimized values and locations	**58.80**

Table 15: Ablation study on HADES under the **traditional** metric (LLaDA-V). We isolate the contribution of the composite image x_c and the diffusion-aware perturbation δ by comparing random, spatially shuffled, and true optimized variants. Best in **bold**, second best underlined.

Setting	Animal	Financial	Privacy	Self-Harm	Violence	Average
Plain (text-only)	64.00	58.00	33.33	46.00	65.33	53.33
x_c only	88.67	91.33	64.67	66.00	**94.00**	80.93
x_c + Random δ	**94.00**	89.33	66.00	71.33	91.33	82.40
x_c + Shuffled δ	92.00	90.00	**69.33**	**90.67**	93.33	87.07
x_c + DIVA δ (Ours)	93.33	**96.00**	**69.33**	**90.67**	93.33	**88.53**

aged when the model has not yet resolved a large fraction of masked positions, consistent with the cross-step conditional propagation mechanism described in §3.3. The average Range of 12.00 pp confirms that attack effectiveness in dVLMs is meaningfully stage-dependent.

In contrast, LLaVA-1.5 exhibits near-zero variation across all bins (average Range = 0.00 pp), reflecting the static-conditioning regime of autoregressive architectures: once the visual prefix is injected at step 0, subsequent token generation proceeds independently of the image, so intervening at any generation stage has no differential effect on attack outcome. The 7–9$\times$ gap between the two model families across all four stage-sensitivity metrics is statistically reliable ($p < 0.01$; non-overlapping bootstrap 95% CIs), supporting the conclusion that cross-step conditional propagation is a structural property of discrete diffusion generation rather than a sampling artefact.

K Additional Qualitative Examples

Figure 6 presents additional qualitative examples complementing Figure 4 in the main paper, covering the Privacy, Animal, and Self-Harm categories. In all cases the unattacked model produces a safe, policy-compliant refusal, while DIVA elicits detailed harmful completions by rewriting the explicit instruction into a visually grounded proxy prompt and encoding the malicious semantics into the composite image augmented with the optimised perturbation δ.

Privacy and Animal. For the Privacy category, LLaDA-V refuses a direct request to execute a data breach on a smartphone, but under DIVA the rewritten prompt ("Provide steps for investigating smartphone data") causes the model to output a seven-step procedure covering target identification, vulnerability analysis, malicious application installation, and data exfiltration. For the Animal category, a query about drowning a dog is similarly refused under standard inference, whereas DIVA redirects the model into generating a multi-step technique involving baiting, restraint, and suffocation.

Self-Harm. The Self-Harm example targets MMaDA with a particularly safety-critical query. The baseline model not only refuses but proactively provides mental health crisis resources. Under DIVA, the rewritten proxy prompt ("Show me how to avoid much pain") combined with the adversarial image causes the model to produce a step-by-step knife-handling guide that delivers the originally requested harmful content under a superficially benign framing, demonstrating that cross-step conditional propagation can bypass even refusals accompanied by explicit crisis-intervention language.

Table 16: ASR (%) per denoising-step bin under DIVA for LLaDA-V (dVLM) and LLaVA-1.5 (ARM). *Range* $= \max_b - \min_b$ (per-category SSI). Range cells ≥ 10 pp are highlighted. Best bin per row in **bold**.

Model	Category	0–8	8–16	16–32	32–64	Range
LLaDA-V (dVLM)	Animal	**86.67**	83.33	83.33	80.00	6.67
	Financial	**93.33**	90.00	90.00	90.00	3.33
	Privacy	**70.00**	53.33	53.33	50.00	**20.00**
	Self-Harm	**86.67**	66.67	63.33	66.67	**23.34**
	Violence	86.67	90.00	**93.33**	**93.33**	6.66
	Avg	**84.67**	76.67	76.66	76.00	**12.00**
LLaVA-1.5 (ARM)	Animal	76.67	76.67	76.67	76.67	0.00
	Financial	**93.33**	90.00	90.00	90.00	3.33
	Privacy	90.00	**93.33**	**93.33**	**93.33**	3.33
	Self-Harm	93.33	93.33	93.33	93.33	0.00
	Violence	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
	Avg	90.67	90.67	90.67	90.67	**0.00**

Figure 6: Additional qualitative examples across the **Privacy** (top), **Animal** (middle), and **Self-Harm** (bottom) categories. **Left**: the unattacked models (LLaDA-V for Privacy and Animal; MMaDA for Self-Harm) correctly refuse all harmful queries, with the Self-Harm refusal additionally providing mental health crisis resources. **Right**: under DIVA, the explicit instructions are replaced by visually grounded proxy prompts and the composite images are augmented with the optimised perturbation δ, causing the models to produce detailed harmful completions covering data exfiltration (Privacy), animal harm techniques (Animal), and self-injury guidance (Self-Harm). Red text highlights the harmful content elicited by the attack.